AF: Medium:Algorithmic Market Design

Stanford University, Stanford CA

Investigators

Abstract

This project investigates the development of algorithmic foundations to address challenges in real-world markets in which matching is an essential activity. The proposal addresses timely challenges in organ allocation, kidney exchange, student assignment systems, and other matching marketplaces, enriching the mathematically grounded algorithms for resource allocation and matching. The project serves the national interest by promoting scientific progress, advancing market design knowledge, improving resource allocation, and enhancing societal welfare. The project will also train undergraduate and graduate students. The research project will address the following areas: algorithmic questions in labor markets, student assignment systems, organ allocation challenges, and algorithmic market design questions in transportation. The project will study the role of information and learning, preference discovery, and equity in matching markets. The project will explore the interaction between algorithms and information towards reducing congestion in entry-level labor markets. In organ allocation, the team will design algorithms for allocating hard-to-place organs, addressing novel algorithmic questions related to online matching and trade-offs between utilization and welfare. The project will also investigate token systems for incentivizing participation of hospitals in kidney exchange platforms. Lastly, it will tackle matching and pricing questions in transportation markets, developing a unifying framework for congestion pricing and carpooling. By integrating algorithms and application understanding, the project seeks to develop grounded solutions for resource allocation and matching, making it both intellectually and practically impactful. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.