Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: The Next Generation of Leakage Attacks and Defenses for Encrypted Databases

Yale University, New Haven CT

Investigators

Abstract

A growing number of works explore the area of encrypted databases as a practical approach to searching on encrypted data stored at a server. The client encrypts the data before uploading it to the server. The server is not given the decryption key, yet the server can execute searches on the encrypted data requested by the client and return the corresponding encrypted answers. An encrypted database efficiently achieves the above functionality by allowing some leakage about the original (plaintext) data that appears harmless but could be exploited by an attacker who attempts to reconstruct the original data by synthesizing leakage from the encrypted answers and encrypted queries over time. This project aims to develop the next generation of methods for building efficient encrypted databases and for analyzing their resilience to reconstruction attacks. To achieve this goal, it uses methods from algorithms, statistics, geometry, databases, and computer systems. Specific research activities include cryptanalysis of the leakage from encrypted databases with suppressed leakage as well as cryptanalysis and schemes for high-dimensional encrypted queries. Informed by the above research thrusts, this project will develop a principled analysis of defenses as well as a framework for quantifying the impact of leakage in the context of encrypted databases. Toward achieving broader impacts, this project includes curriculum development for computer security courses, efforts to include students in research activities, and outreach to industry and government audiences. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.