Active Control-Enabled Approaches for Handling Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems

University Of California-Davis, Davis CA

Investigators

Abstract

The U.S chemical industry, with manufacturing operations automated using advanced process control systems (PCSs), is a critical component of the national economy. However, the increasing reliance of PCSs on digital communications and networking technologies, together with the growth in complexity and sophistication of cyberattack techniques, have rendered industrial PCSs vulnerable to cyberattacks by malicious agents. Cyberattacks on PCSs aim to disrupt process operations, potentially resulting in adverse effects on public safety and prosperity. The traditional approach for improving cybersecurity of PCSs involves fortifying information technology (IT) systems to prevent a cyberattacker or malicious software from gaining access to the PCS network. However, IT-based cybersecurity approaches remain vulnerable, motivating methods that account for the threat of cyberattacks directly in the PCS design and operation. In this project, computational and modeling tools will be developed to design PCS-based detection methods capable of sensing the presence of cyberattacks in industrially relevant processes to enhance the resiliency and cybersecurity of PCSs. The project findings will provide fundamental insights into which cyberattacks can be detected and how detection sensitivity is linked to PCS performance. Undergraduate and graduate student researchers will be recruited to carry out the research activities, those which include simulated cyberattacks on large-scale industrial processes. Overall, the transformative impact of this project is in its creation of a cybersecurity framework that is directly integrated into PCS design considerations and subsequent operation, driving a paradigm shift in PCS cybersecurity away from treating cyberthreats to PCSs exclusively as an IT-specific problem. The increasing reliance of chemical manufacturing Process Control Systems (PCSs) on advanced communications and networking technologies and the growing sophistication of cyberattacks have rendered industrial PCSs vulnerable to attacks by malicious agents. Cyberattacks on PCSs aim to disrupt operations, destabilize processes, or cause safety incidents. Traditionally, PCS cybersecurity has been based on fortifying Information Technology (IT) systems to prevent a cyberattacker or malicious software from gaining access to the PCS network. While improving IT security will prevent some cyberattacks on PCSs, an attacker may circumvent the IT security measures over extended periods of time without the knowledge of the process operators. This fundamental limitation of IT-based cybersecurity motivates a control-based approach. In this project, active control-enabled cyberattack detection methods will be developed to signal external attacks that manipulate data communicated over the sensor-controller and controller-actuator links. The methods will incorporate cyberattack detection considerations directly in the PCS design and operation. The main research objectives of the project include a) identifying the fundamental properties of cyberattack detectability, including conditions for cyberattack detectability verification, and elucidating the role of the PCS design in cyberattack detectability, b) formulating a PCS design optimization problem that ensures detectability of cyberattacks, c) developing active cyberattack design methodologies to probe/manipulate the PCS to detect stealthy cyberattacks, and d) applying the detection methods to simulated benchmark chemical processes to demonstrate and analyze the performance of this new approach to cybersecurity. The project is expected to advance the fundamental understanding of cyberattack detectability and develop novel control-enabled software tools for cyberattack detection. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.