Doctoral Dissertation Research: Voter Demand for the Public Provision of Private Goods

Yale University, New Haven CT

Investigators

Abstract

This project investigates the rise of programs in developing democracies that distribute government-procured private goods like televisions, laptops, and clothes. Such programs now reach millions of beneficiaries and cost billions of dollars each year. Critics contend that there is limited evidence that they correct market failures or constitute an efficient redistributive mechanism. Supporters argue that they are essential to bridging gaps left by the operation of markets and ensure greater economic equality. This research aims to understand if voters reward private goods programs at the ballot box, as well the conditions under which citizens support them. The research will entail a survey that asks citizens to choose between hypothetical programs with differing features, such as the type of good, the value of the benefit, the impact on other types of government expenditure, and the degree of partisan targeting. The other major component of the research is an analysis of the electoral effects of a program that distributed millions of free color televisions. The study will contribute to our understanding of the political logic of governments' decisions to publicly provide different classes of goods and how economic development affects voter demand and political incentives for providing collective and private goods. The data that will be collected as part of this study will be a valuable resource for informing public policy through empirical data on citizen preferences and the correspondence between these preferences and government action. This study aims to understand the political economy of in-kind redistribution in developing democracies. It examines the conditions under which voters support and reward large government programs that distribute consumer goods. The research hypothesizes that voters support the public provision of private goods but that this support is conditional on program design and implementation. A number of related theoretical propositions will be tested using a forced-choice conjoint survey experiment in which respondents provide stated preferences over pairs of hypothetical government programs with randomly assigned characteristics. This design will provide insights into how voters trade off the type and value of the benefit against features such as eligibility criteria and possible impacts on other categories of government spending such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure. In addition, the proposed design will shed light on how political factors such as partisan targeting moderate support. These data are paired with a difference-in-differences analysis of the electoral consequences of a program that eventually distributed over fifteen million color televisions to understand if citizens reward such programs or if they are a relatively minor consideration in voting decisions and an opportunity instead for politicians to forge links with firms and interest groups. The research will improve our theoretical and empirical understanding of how political factors shape government efforts to provide private and public goods. It will also provide insights into the conditions under which we are likely to observe a shift away from political clientelism and towards programmatic competition based on the provision of collective goods in developing democracies. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.