Doctoral Dissertation Research: The Distributive Properties of the Bureaucracy

Columbia University, New York NY

Investigators

Abstract

The hiring of public sector employees is an important part of the bureaucratic process. Political incentives to target government jobs to certain populations or constituencies have the potential to influence the manner in which these jobs, as well as public goods, are distributed. Thus, understanding the distribution of bureaucratic jobs can provide insight into the functioning of governance. The project will examine interactions between the legislature and bureaucracy, as well as constituent relations and political incentives, to study the distribution of bureaucratic jobs. The project will present a formal model of how bureaucratic jobs are distributed. In addition to legislative bargaining, several policy instruments that shape who is hired will be included in the model. As well, the model will include variables relating social structure to the use of these policy instruments and the ultimate composition of the public sector. Moreover, the formal model will seek to demonstrate the link between hiring and public goods, by identifying inefficiencies resulting from the political determinants of hiring. To test the predictions of the model empirically, the project will collect systematic, micro-level data on public employees, official public sector wages, and proposed public sector reforms.