Doctoral Dissertation Research: Enforcing Pollution Regulations in Authoritarian Regimes

University Of California-Berkeley, Berkeley CA

Investigators

Abstract

General Summary This research project explains how authoritarian countries enforce pollution regulation. Moreover, this research examines the interactions between national and subnational institutions as they relate to enforcement of pollution regulation. This project examines how two major institutions have created divergent incentives structures for local bureaucrats that produce the following research questions: 1) Does the fact that budget-poor bureaucrats are dependent on polluting firms make budget-poor bureaucrats more likely to defy the central authority and protect polluters than their budget-rich counterparts?; 2)Do state ownership of firms make it easier for local officials to obtain compliance from certain polluters? By highlighting the impact of state institutions on bureaucratic behavior, this project draws attention to under-explored structural explanations for why government agents systematically defy-or obey-government leaders. It also examines the tools and strategies authoritarian leaders use to confront emerging governance crisis. Technical Summary This research project explains how authoritarian countries enforce pollution regulation. Moreover, this research examines the interactions between national and subnational institutions as they relate to enforcement of pollution regulation. Using China as the case of interest, this project draws on case study research and statistical analysis to ascertain when officials in China's 283 prefecture-level cities choose to punish-or protect-polluters. The quantitative component uses two original datasets to test for key variables associated with weak enforcement of pollution regulation in China: First, using NASA satellite data, the PI compiles a database on the level of pollution violations in 283 cities. Second, to assess how firm ownership affects pollution enforcement, the PI compiles data on individual firm characteristics of all major polluting firms in the 283 cities. The PI project then uses interview research with regulators (local officials) and the regulated (polluting firms) to explain the patterns revealed by quantitative data. Interviews are conducted in two regions of China with contrasting records on pollution to understand how incentives to enforce pollution regulation may vary in these two regions. The PI focuses on the motivations of individual officials and factory owners. This study provides important understanding on the incentive structure that regulates administrative behavior in authoritarian regimes.