EAGER: Exploring Trade-offs in Cyber Offense and Defense Through the Lenses of Computer and Political Science

Southern Methodist University, Dallas TX

Investigators

Abstract

This project examines the trade-offs governments face between engaging in cyber offense and defense. Governments may exploit a somewhat less secure Internet to gain intelligence and strategic advantage. But a more secure Internet encourages more participation online and reduces citizens' exposure to cybercrime. Thus governments face a difficult dilemma: Should they forego potentially useful cyber operations and work on strengthening the Internet in order to provide a global good? To answer this question, this project aims to construct a taxonomy of offensive and defensive cyber operations, describing the range of attack options and the possible collateral damage they may cause. The project's findings may benefit U.S. national security by giving policymakers a way of assessing the value of offensive cyber operations against the unintended consequences. Specifically, the proposed research project has three related components: The first component is a summary and assessment of different approaches to offensive and defensive cyber operations and classes of vulnerabilities. The second is an examination of the suitability of two political science theories to the debate over cybersecurity policy: hegemonic stability theory and offense-defense theory. To evaluate these theories in the cyber context, the researchers conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis of historical Internet resiliency, retrospective accounting of prior cyber operations, structured controlled comparative analyses, and counterfactual analyses of past operations. The third part of the project uses the foregoing analysis to develop guidelines for policymakers and intelligence organizations about when to disclose or stockpile vulnerabilities, and how to choose among several different strategies available to balance offense and defense. This project has the potential to transform how we understand the international politics of cybersecurity. It examines cyber warfare trade-offs by testing established political science theories with rigorous computer science analysis. This approach creates an opportunity for reaching an important theoretical breakthrough by deriving parsimonious measures of internet resilience and the offense-defense balance in cyberspace.