Doctoral Dissertation Research: Institutional Design as Mediator in the Political and Economic Effects of Supranational Court Decisions

University Of California-Los Angeles, Los Angeles CA

Investigators

Abstract

Can international courts promote economic cooperation among countries? International courts cannot compel compliance with their rulings yet sometimes actually change the behavior of governments. This project posits that two factors influence whether a country complies with the ruling of an international court. First, domestic political divisions hinder compliance with court rulings and prolong disputes by making policy change more difficult. Second, the design of an international court---namely its ability to punish non-compliance---can mitigate this effect. The results of this analysis will help both scholars and policy-makers to understand how the United States can effectively promote its economic interests in trade cooperation. It is key to understand when international courts can (and cannot) resolve economic disputes given their significance to the United States. The argument is tested by examining litigation at the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body and the European Court of Justice. Compliance and causation have been difficult to estimate; this project will make a substantial theoretical contribution by developing a new model for estimating causal effects. This project will create a novel dataset and statistical analysis of two measures of compliance. First, the project will examine the economic impact of court rulings using trade patterns for hundreds of commodities and a new statistical model for estimating causal effects. Second, the project will measure the political impact of court rulings using evidence from news archives about whether governments enact legislative and policy changes after adverse rulings. In addition, this project will contribute to training an undergraduate student in methods in the social sciences.