The origins and social consequences of moral realism
Boston College, Chestnut Hill MA
Investigators
Abstract
This proposal unites approaches from developmental psychology, social neuroscience, and philosophy to investigate the developmental origins and social consequences of moral realism: the notion that morals, like facts, can be objectively true and false. This position is contrasted with anti-realism:the notion that morals, like preferences, are subjective. Although realism and anti-realism have traditionally been investigated within philosophy, recent work in psychology has provided some support for the hypothesis that laypeople are realists. Other studies indicate that moral realism has both positive (e.g., increasing donations to charity) and negative (e.g., increasing interpersonal discomfort with those who disagree with one's views) consequences. The proposed work builds on this prior literature in psychology and philosophy. Studies 1-2 examine the extent to which preschoolers consider moral claims across diverse contexts to be objectively true and test the hypothesis that moral realism enhances, and anti-realism attenuates, intergroup bias. Using functional neuroimaging, Studies 3A-3B investigate the social consequences of moral realism among adults. These studies test the prediction that adults dehumanize those who do not share their morally relevant beliefs and that moral realism enhances, and anti-realism attenuates, this effect. Intellectual Merit. These studies address two key questions of theoretical interest. First, what is the role of social experience in moral cognition? On the one hand, if mature moral cognition in adults is the product of prolonged social learning, children would be expected to reason differently from adults. On the other hand, similarities between children and adults would indicate that the additional years of social learning accumulated during adulthood are unnecessary for particular forms of moral cognition. Second, how do children and adults reason about different types of moral beliefs? Previous work has drawn conclusions about "moral realism" based on investigations of unambiguous moral beliefs (e.g., murder is wrong). However, many moral beliefs are more ambiguous (e.g., is it better to tell an unflattering truth or a small lie?) Unlike unambiguous moral beliefs, ambiguous moral beliefs can lead to disagreements across individuals and cultures. In addition to addressing these questions, the current studies elucidate the troubling consequences of moral realism?including implicit bias, explicit bias, and dehumanization?and test the prediction that moral anti-realism can attenuate these consequences. To achieve these goals, the present studies integrate methodological approaches from developmental psychology, social neuroscience, and philosophy, leading to unique insight unobtainable from any field alone. Broader Impacts. The proposed work benefits society both in its contribution of specific research findings and in its use of research methods. First, these studies will investigate the impact of meta-ethical beliefs on intergroup bias, suggesting that adopting a moral realist stance enhances bias, whereas adopting a moral anti-realist stance decreases bias. These results may inform interventions aimed at reducing intergroup hostility by acting on people's meta-ethical beliefs. Second, the developmental methods used in this research will also benefit the public by providing children with the opportunity to learn about and participate in research. Data will be collected at a children's museum, providing ample opportunity for the researcher to discuss the methods, hypotheses, and findings with interested families. Additionally, interacting with male and female experimenters from diverse racial backgrounds may encourage children from groups under-represented in the sciences to pursue scientific interests.
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