Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science;International Security and the Politics of Interdependence

Princeton University, Princeton NJ

Investigators

Abstract

This project develops a theory of cooperation in multilateral military interventions. Whether launched ad hoc or in the institutional framework of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union or African Union, multilateral interventions rely on voluntary troop contributions by sovereign states. For states, however, participating in such endeavors is costly in financial as well as political terms. This project thus addresses the question: what are the motivating factors behind an individual country's troop deployments? The project proposes that participants to most military interventions need to be divided into leaders and laggards. Leaders are understood as the drivers behind the launch of specific operations, pursuing sharply defined political, economic or normative interests. Laggards, on the other hand, lack such interests or at least do not share the same interest intensity as do leaders. The laggards thus need additional incentives to motivate their force deployments, and such incentives are most often provided by leaders. The project then develops a theory about how interdependence between leaders and laggards influences the probability that the laggards will join the security coalition. The investigator tests this theory by examining the recruitment process of three distinct security operations: the United Nations operation in East Timor, the European Union operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, and the US-led operation in Iraq. This qualitative analysis complements the results of the already completed large-N regression analysis, which includes all 132 multilateral military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War. Its results suggest that there is a statistically significant correlation between the degree of interdependence between leaders and laggards and the laggards' probability of contributing troops to an operation of the leader's choice. The intellectual merit of this project thus lies in its capacity to shed new light on multilateral military interventions, arguably the most forceful tool to create world order. Although often depicted as mounted by international organizations, military interventions never ensue from international rules or regulations but are always the product of pure political will mustered by participating actors. This project breaks new ground in analyzing how such political will can be created. The empirical basis for the analysis comprises both qualitative case studies and an original dataset encompassing all security operations since the end of the Cold War. This project has broader implications as well. Interdependence is a defining feature of contemporary global politics. At times interdependence carries negative connotations. This project suggests the positive impact of interdependence. In particular, interdependence between states can enhance international cooperation in the security realm.