Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Democratic Accountability in International Relations: Domestic Pressures and Constraints for Coercive Foreign Policy

Texas A&M Research Foundation, College Station TX

Investigators

Abstract

Do citizens in democracies hold their leaders accountable for foreign policy promises and actions? How and how much do citizen preferences and expectations constrain the actions of national leaders in international crises? These questions are of obvious importance in a democracy. Scholars and policy makers alike have highlighted the role that democratic accountability mechanisms play in constraining the foreign policies of democratic states. Yet no consensus exists as to the specific role that constituents' preferences play when it comes to fomenting or restraining the use of coercive foreign policies. Scholars have often assumed the nature of public preferences and have devoted insufficient attention to identifying empirically what domestic audiences expect for national action are in times of international crises. This project seeks to redress those shortcomings. The project proposes a model that integrates two arguments about democratic accountability that are present in extant research on international relations but have not yet been linked together. The first school focuses on the extent to which a leader represents constituents' substantive foreign policy preferences, and contends that when an executive acts contrary to popular preferences, she will lose support. The second school maintains that executives who back down after committing to a course of foreign policy action are held accountable as constituents prefer consistent leaders. This project proposes that the effects of both sets of public preferences interact with each other. Citizens' preference for consistent leaders who implement the foreign policy threats to which they publicly commit can be very influential in determining popular support for the executive in times of international crisis. This is not always the case, however, for executive approval is not exclusively a product of executive statements and actions. When voters learn about these statements and actions in a time of international crisis, they also have a priori expectations of what types of foreign policies their nation should pursue. Thus the researcher posits that, against the received wisdom, executives might be advised to make public foreign policy announcements in times of international conflict. If leaders stay silent when constituents expect otherwise, they may lose vital support in a time of crisis. The project empirically investigates its argument by conducting experiments and cross-national analyses in two of the globe's most prominent democracies, the United States and the United Kingdom. The use of experiments probes the micro-foundations of individuals' reactions to executive action (and inaction) in times of international conflict. The experiments are complemented by cross-national statistical examination of military and economic foreign policy actions. This project has several broader implications. This project enhances understanding of how domestic factors influence the initiation of military interventions and the imposition of economic sanctions. Comprehending these dynamics in public opinion can shed light on when domestic audiences will support or oppose costly foreign policies in times of international conflict. By advancing knowledge of the impact and import of citizen opinion for foreign policy, the project enriches the general understanding of how democracy works.