NeTS: Small: Encryption on the Air: Non-Invasive Security for Wireless Medical Devices

Massachusetts Institute Of Technology, Cambridge MA

Investigators

Abstract

Wireless communication has become an intrinsic part of modern implantable medical devices (IMDs). Recent work, however, has demonstrated that wireless connectivity can be exploited to compromise the confidentiality of IMDs' transmitted data or to send unauthorized commands to IMDs. The key challenge in addressing these attacks stems from the difficulty of modifying or replacing already-implanted IMD. This research explores the feasibility of protecting an implantable device from such attacks without modifying the device itself. It develops a solution that delegates the security of an IMD to a personal base station called the shield. The shield introduces a novel radio design that allows it to jam the IMD's messages, preventing others from decoding them while being able to decode them itself. It can also jam unauthorized commands --even those that try to alter the shield's own transmissions. The research delivers a novel full-duplex radio design that, in contrast to past work, has no requirements on antenna separation and hence can be built into a wearable device. It also delivers the first non-invasive security mechanism for securing IMDs? communications without modifying them. Finally, it increases the resilience of wireless medical devices to jamming attacks, bad channel conditions, and interference. By enabling medical devices to leverage wireless communication without incurring security risks, the research can improve the quality of life for patients and reduce the cost of healthcare systems. The broader impact plan also includes academic publications, integration in educational programs, and working with the medical device industry.