Doctoral Dissertation Research: Focal Social Actors and Tacit Coordination

Miami University, Oxford OH

Investigators

Abstract

In this project the Principal Investigators will explore the potential impact of social focal points on tacit coordination in small groups. Coordination of actions is a common and important process in social and organizational life. Successful coordination leads to efficient interactions and teamwork, while failures in coordination can have detrimental impacts on both social relationships as well as economic outcomes. Research on tacit coordination has focused largely on structural focal points, or solutions to a coordination problem which are suggested through the situation itself or the particular behavioral options available to individuals. This project will extend such thinking to include social focal points, which come from differential uniqueness, conspicuousness, or prominence among the social actors themselves. Four experimental studies will address: 1) how the presence of a focal social actor impacts coordination success in small groups, 2) different ways in which players and options can correspond to yield this effect, and 3) whether or not being a focal actor is universally beneficial. It is expected that the presence of a focal social actor will improve coordination by suggesting a strategy which sees individuals more likely to select behavioral options which are related to or correspond with the social actor. To address these questions we will create focal actors through false feedback regarding social traits. All studies will use groups of three participants. Feedback will be manipulated such that groups are either homogenous on a social trait or comprised of one unique individual who differs on a social trait from two others in the group. In terms of broader impacts this research will contribute to our understanding of how interdependent entities coordinate their actions, a question which has interested social psychologists, economists, and laypersons alike. Such an understanding has far reaching implications for common social interactions such as conversation, collaborative work, and traffic negotiation. By adding social factors to the formal concepts of game theory, this work will shed more light on the question of how tacit coordination works. It will build on existing research to extend the concept of social focal points and it will attempt to explain several seemingly disparate phenomena, such as the impact of status, timing, and outside options on behavior in coordination games. It will add to the growing body of evidence that those interested in coordinated behavior would be well served to consider not just factors regarding the problem set or structural environment, but also features of the social actors facing the coordination problem.