Collaborative Research. Market Bubbles As Expression Of Social Norms: Experiments
California Institute Of Technology, Pasadena CA
Investigators
Abstract
In this research project, the PIs investigate the possibility that social rationality explains the emergence of one type of bubble in competitive asset markets: a bubble referred to as a "credit market bubble." The bubble is defined as a situation where (i) the debt is priced above its commonly known intrinsic value and (ii) the debt is rolled over even though each creditor should cash in because everyone knows that the debtor will never be able to repay. Building on evidence from behavioral game theory, the PIs conjecture that such credit market bubbles emerge whenever the debtor's payment ability, although never sufficient, grows over time. Pilot experimental data confirm the emergence of bubbles in this setting. The researchers will conduct experiments to further examine the robustness of bubbles in this environment and test the hypothesis that norms are driving the observed behavior. In terms of broader impacts, this research will provide a better understanding of price bubbles. Credit bubbles and accompanying asset price run-ups re-occur with alarming frequency in the real world. This research suggests that tension between individual and social rationality is the root cause for their existence. It will lead to a better understanding of this ubiquitous phenomenon in modern capitalist society, and inspire novel and effective government policy and regulation to minimize their negative effects.
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