The Logic of Collective Action in Large Groups

University South Carolina Research Foundation, Columbia SC

Investigators

Abstract

SES-1058236 Brent Simpson University of South Carolina At least since the 1960s social scientists have argued that large groups face greater problems than small groups in organizing successful collective actions. While many researchers have taken issue with this original reasoning and there is continuing debate about why group size impairs successful collective action, most collective action scholars agree that it does. Empirical studies in natural settings and carefully controlled laboratory experiments support the predicted negative relationship between group size and collective action. Importantly, systematic comparisons show that group size negatively affects cooperation even when the objective incentive to contribute to the group is held constant, and that people perceive large groups to be less efficacious than small groups, even under conditions in which large groups are objectively more efficacious. Of course, there are collective actions with large numbers of contributors in the real world. The question is thus how large groups overcome the problems associated with group size to realize their common interests. The answer proposed here is based on an emergent solution to the group size problem: Larger groups grow out of successful smaller collective actions. They so by capitalizing on the gains from starting small. That is, groups harness the higher contributions of initially small groups and continue those higher contributions as they grow larger. The investigator will conduct three laboratory experiments designed to test key implications of the argument. The first experiment addresses the basic argument in the context of public goods provisions (where people must contribute private resources to produce a public good available to all). The second experiment extends the research in several directions. First, it will test the proposed solution to the group size problem in the context of common-pool resources (where people must refrain from overharvesting from publicly owned resources). In addition, the second experiment will address the role of a ?marketplace? of collective action groups, in which people make decisions about which group to join. The investigator hypothesizes that marketplaces help further catalyze the mechanisms through which successful small collective action groups grow into successful large collective actions. The third experiment tests the argument using larger groups. Broader Impacts: In addition to the importance of gaining a theoretical understanding of the group size problem, and how large groups are able to realize their common interests, the research has a number of broader impacts. Many of the most important problems facing groups and societies, from the local to the global level, entail the production of public goods (e.g., maintenance of public media outlets, the creation and maintenance of blood and organ supplies) or the preservation of commons (healthy and productive forests and waterways). The collective action problems posed by public goods and common pool resources are exacerbated in larger groups. Thus, as societies continue to become interlinked, the collective action problems we face become increasingly global, making it even more important to understand the processes through which large groups can realize common interests (and the conditions under which they do not). In addition to these societal-level broader impacts, the research will provide education and training of graduate and undergraduate students.