Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Treaty Compliance, Enforcement and Monitoring: A Preference-Based Approach

University Of California-San Diego, La Jolla CA

Investigators

Abstract

Multilateral treaties represent some of the most ambitious, comprehensive, and yet controversial efforts at global cooperation. This project addresses two overarching questions about these treaties: (1) Which treaty designs are "stronger" in terms of their ability to bring signatories into compliance? (2) How do different types of regimes react to different treaty enforcement and monitoring mechanisms? The project will conduct an in-depth quantitative analysis of the relationship between countries' decisions to sign treaties, the designs of those treaties, and countries' rates of compliance. One problem in doing such research is that it is difficult to infer from rates of observed compliance that a treaty is working effectively. Social scientists have long recognized this problem, but have not been able to find an effective solution to it. This project's solution to the long-standing problem is based on the notion that treaties work to the extent they cause countries to do something they would not otherwise do. Accordingly, to understand whether or not treaties work, the first task is to estimate the probability with which countries would have complied with treaties in any event. The investigator uses a novel methodology he has developed to overcome this problem. The intuition behind the method is that, by observing and comparing the past behaviors of many countries with respect to treaties, it is possible to discover which treaties are closer to each country's preferred set of actions. Using this method, the investigator will have results that indicate not only which treaties are effective at modifying countries' behaviors, but also the extent to which they do so, which will allow for valuable treaty-by-treaty comparisons. This study will include some of the most prominent global treaties dealing with trade, finance, human rights, environmental and arms control issues. This project's methodological innovation in itself improves understanding of which treaties work well and which do not. Beyond that, the project permits assessment of which types of treaty enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have relatively great effects on state behavior. For example, the study will indicate whether treaties that rely on domestic courts for enforcement are more effective than those that rely on international courts. In addition, the project takes account of the important interaction between institutional treaty mechanisms and country characteristics. It allows appraisal, for example, of which types of treaties are most effective with respect to democracies and which are more likely to change the behaviors of non-democracies. The project will thus make several broader contributions. It will enhance understanding of treaty institutions, which in turn could significantly benefit the prospects of global cooperation. This project is designed to indicate, both theoretically and empirically, which types of treaty enforcement and monitoring mechanisms lead to greater degrees of treaty compliance. Its results could therefore guide future treaty negotiations and suggest which treaty mechanisms are more likely to be effective than others and in which contexts.