An Empirical Study of the Administrative Process: Interest Group Participation and Influence in Complex Rulemakings

University Of Texas At Austin, Austin TX

Investigators

Abstract

An Empirical Study of the Administrative Process: Interest Group Participation and Influence in Complex Rulemakings This study tests a theory of "information capture," in which the excessive use of information and related information costs can serve as one means by which regulated parties gain control over regulatory decision-making. The information capture thesis predicts the nearly complete monopolization of the rulemaking process by regulated parties in a potentially large set of regulations that are complex and technical, but that nevertheless have an important impact on public health and welfare. This study utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods to test rulemakings for correlations between interest group participation and influence as it relates to rule complexity. Specifically, the study will involve the collection of data on four distinct sets of rules promulgated by three separate agencies (totaling over 250 rules) over a period of more than three decades. It will examine the entire life cycle of the rulemakings in each of these sets of rules. The number of rules promulgated by federal agencies dwarfs the number of laws passed by Congress. Yet despite its widely recognized significance, the rulemaking process remains an under-studied part of the federal legal and political system. The study offers an empirical basis for understanding some of the possible limits of agency accountability within current administrative process.