Measurement and Isomorphism in the Psychology of Perception: A Historical Approach to the Problem of Representation

University Of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA

Investigators

Abstract

Introduction This project will provide a historical account of the problem of representation. That problem is characterized by the following questions. What does our perceptual experience tell us about the world? How is information about the world represented in the brain? In the past hundred years, wildly different philosophical accounts of representation have been offered. By contrast, the methods and presuppositions of the scientific study of perception remained surprisingly robust during that same period. This project combines historical investigation of the development of perception science with philosophical analysis of its implicit notions of representation. Intellectual Merit By investigating the historical context within which successful methods and paradigms emerged at a time when philosophy and psychology were in closer contact than today, the project will reestablish contact between contemporary scientific practice and its philosophical roots. Two key ideas guide this investigation. The first is an insight going back to Aristotle: Our experience represents the world by being somehow similar to it. The second idea is just that experience is similar to the world in the same way that a measurement is similar to the quantity measured. Similarity has been an extremely problematic notion from a philosophical standpoint, but the analogy with measurement will suggest a response to these longstanding worries. The ultimate goal is to produce a precise account of representation that conforms to contemporary scientific practice while answering contemporary philosophical questions. Potential Broader Impacts: How does the human mind/brain perceive the world? One answer is that is does so by developing internal representations of the external world. This answer has spurred ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and in cognitive and psychological science. This project brings together psychological practice and philosophical theory to develop an account of perceptual representation that is sensitive to the demands of both disciplines. It will foster communication between philosophy and the sciences and encourage interdisciplinary thought. If successful, the project will answer longstanding foundational questions in perceptual science and inspire new empirical and philosophical questions about our perceptual experience.