Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Judicial Reform and Court Curbing in Comparative Perspective

Washington University, Saint Louis MO

Investigators

Abstract

When and why do legislators seek reforms to empower or restrict the national judiciary, and what makes these efforts successful? Judicial independence is an oft cited "top priority" to democracy advocates around the globe, yet very little is known about how an independent judiciary is viewed or valued by political elites, or how broder patterns of political competition implicate judicial institutions and inter-branch exchange. This project is a novel approach to understanding this phenomenon by explicitly attending to micro-level political incentives elected officials face when deciding to restrict or empower a national judiciary. This research interprets judicial reform proposals as a "position-taking" opportunity for elected officials, advanced by elites for their own electoral gain. Interpreting inter-branch engagement in this way - rooting it squarely in a strategic profile of ambitious elected officials - offers a novel way to theorize relations between legislative and judicial institutions. The investigator extends this notion of position-taking as one which can be understood with reference to electoral incentives to explore this phenomenon cross-nationally. Specifically, the research anticipates observable consequences in the frequency of, justification for, and likelihood of eventual adoption of judicial reforms on the basis of electoral institutions and political incentives. Where institutions incentivize legislators to differentiate themselves from their party's platform, the research expects reform proposals to be more frequent, to be justified in terms of specific policy outcomes, but will only rarely constitute a credible threat to fundamentally altering judicial institutions. Cross-national and time-serial variation of electoral institutions and public confidence in the judiciary provide an optimal testing ground for these hypotheses. This research will contribute to our understanding of the political basis of judicial activism and independence by situating courts in larger arena of political conflict and competition. An independent judiciary - one that is impervious to external political influence - is seen as a critical locus for the promotion of human rights, the property rights necessary for economic development and the entrenchment of the rule of law. By first understanding how political elites seek to shape judicial institutions for their own political gain and what makes them successful in doing so, we can begin to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for increased judicial influence and participation.