Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Voter Behavior And Seniority Advantage In Congress

Florida State University, Tallahassee FL

Investigators

Abstract

This project investigates voter behavior due to seniority advantage in Congress. It is possible that voters compete for pork barrel funds by reelecting incumbents to maintain seniority. This leads to a transfer of tax dollars from districts or states with junior legislators to those with more senior ones. Primary interest lies in discovering whether voters respond more to monetary rewards or visceral stimulation caused by policy representation. Term limits are also considered as a mechanism to reduce the cost of electing a challenger as well as reducing the asymmetry in pork barrel distribution. Controlled laboratory experiments are utilized where subjects are divided into districts and act as legislators and voters. Intellectual Merit: There are no previous experimental studies that test subject reactions to monetary payoffs against reactions to visceral stimulation, let alone in a setting as relevant as voting. Much of the existing literature on seniority advantage proposes that voters prefer monetary benefits to policy representation, but this is the first attempt to test that belief. The experimental design is novel in its use of visceral stimulation via political issues as well as the method by which subjects express policy support through donations to foundations that support particular sides of the featured political issue. Finding that voters weigh monetary benefits less heavily in the voting decision than policy representation will impact the way economists and political scientists view vote choice. Such a finding would also lead naturally to investigating the evolution of voting behavior and whether this result is a natural response to incentives or whether voters have been conditioned by current institutions. Broader Impacts: If term limits are found to be effective at reducing disparity in tax benefits as well reducing the cost of searching for better policy representation, serious consideration should be given to changing the internal institutions of Congress.