CAREER: Network Economics: Theory and Architectures for Incentive-engineered Networks

University Of Southern California, Los Angeles CA

Investigators

Abstract

The next generation networks are envisaged to be very large-scale, highly complex systems that handle heterogeneous traffic in diverse environments, are truly distributed and have even greater capacity, reliability and capability. These attributes can be achieved by deploying sophisticated mathematical techniques that require cooperative behavior among the various independent entities that often have economic interests. Such cooperation however, can be hard to achieve in practice leading to suboptimal performance. In this project, we are developing a systematic and foundational theory of network incentives and cooperation that aids in methodical network architecture design for vastly greater capacity, more efficient operation and improved reliability. The theory, mechanisms and architectures for incentive engineered networks that we are developing combine ideas from mathematical economics, game theory, information and queueing theories. The project will have substantial broader impact on the development of science, technology and education by leading to development of the emerging field of network economics, and has broad relevance in improving the efficiency and reliability of networks for communication, transportation, electrical power distribution, and civil infrastructure. The project is developing a new framework of network market design for economics-informed resource allocation on the Internet, non-cooperative multi-user communication theory for cooperative spectrum sharing, and a new incentivized QoS network architecture for QoS provisioning on the Internet. These have the potential to transform existing wireless and communication networks. Conducted research shall be disseminated through a tutorial on networks economic and games that the PI is writing, through classroom teaching and a high school outreach program.