New Issues in Matching Market Design

National Bureau Of Economic Research Inc, Cambridge MA

Investigators

Abstract

This project uses game theory and empirical analysis to understand the incentive and stability properties of resource allocation mechanisms. The investigator develops a theoretical framework to compare allocation methods based on the extent to which they are susceptible to 'gaming'. The goal is to understand whether one method is more or less easy for one group of participants to manipulate. This work provides a coherent analysis of existing allocation methods, and it also provides a framework for comparing new methods that are developed by other researchers. The second project funded by this award studies how a particular type of complementarity (the presence of couples) affects the inventives and performance of two-sided matching markets, such as those used for entry-level labor market clearinghouses. The data analysis part of this project uses data from the centralized labor market for psychologists. This research has substantial and direct social benefit. It creates tools that will aid school administrators in developing new ways to conduct school choice programs. The PI has already been involved in designing new methods for school choice programs in New York and Massachusetts.