The Role of Explanation in Causal Reasoning and Categorization
University Of California-Berkeley, Berkeley CA
Investigators
Abstract
Children, adults, and scientists alike confront the world with a common question: Why? We wonder why people behave in particular ways, why objects have specific properties, and why events unfold as they do. Previous research suggests that there are different kinds of explanations with unique properties, among them mechanistic explanations that appeal to causal mechanisms, and functional explanations that appeal to functions and goals. For example, a tiger's stripes can be explained mechanistically by appeal to genes and development, or functionally by appeal to camouflage. The proposed project investigates the relationship between these kinds of explanations and basic cognitive processes. In particular, the investigators will ask the question of whether mechanistic and functional explanations lead to different ways of conceptualizing objects, and even to different ways of representing the causal structure of the world. Given the intimate relationship between explanation and understanding, explanations may have far-reaching effects on cognition. The proposed work will address contemporary issues in cognitive psychology concerning causal reasoning and categorization, and has the potential to resolve current controversies concerning the nature of causal representation and the role of causal beliefs and functions in categorization. The project is also of relevance to issues in philosophy regarding causation and explanation, and will foster interdisciplinary communication. Finally, by uncovering the characteristics and consequences of different kinds of explanations, the proposed work will lay the foundations for research concerning children and adults' understanding of scientific explanations, including why some scientific explanations are especially difficult to grasp and how this difficulty can be overcome.
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