NECO: Provably Assurable Ad Hoc Networks under Arbitrary Malicious Behaviors

Purdue University, West Lafayette IN

Investigators

Abstract

Ad hoc wireless networks are becoming important in several application domains. In these networks, nodes cooperate among themselves to achieve collective tasks, without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure. However, the cooperative nature and the possible hostile environments where the networks may be deployed make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. Some of these attacks can be addressed through customized cryptographic primitives. However, the adversary can physically compromise the network nodes, and thus defeat the cryptographic measures. Further, the adversary may have much higher computational and communication capabilities than the legitimate nodes, and the malicious nodes can collude among themselves. This has created a difficult imbalance in securing ad hoc networks---defense is hard and resource-consuming while attack is often easy. In this project, the PIs at Purdue University are developing a provably-assurable ad hoc network protocol suite to invert this imbalance. The system developed can give guaranteed security properties under a wide, and rigorously quantifiable, range of adversarial behaviors, including Byzantine behaviors. The project employs two main thrusts: (i) Security by diversification and randomization; and (ii) Security through accountability and reputation. The solution is applied to secure routing, secure data aggregation, and distributed leader selection. Broader Impact: The project will significantly advance our understanding of the fundamental limits for security in wireless ad hoc networks. It will provide methods to design provably-secure wireless protocols for a large class of mission-critical applications. The results will be disseminated through public release of detailed design documents, software, and graduate course materials.