Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature

William Marsh Rice University, Houston TX

Investigators

Abstract

Primary Investigators: Mark Jones and Raul Gonzalez Title: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Procedural Cartels and the Mexican State Legislature 0720310 Abstract Can political parties maintain their control over legislative agendas when there is no reelection? This research project addresses this question by analyzing how electoral incentives and party politics shape agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures. Over the past twenty years, the concurrent rise of electoral competition and fiscal decentralization has encouraged the state legislatures to assert their autonomy across a range of policy domains. No longer are deputies automatically deferring to the governor's office; they have instead become active participants of the political press and thus merit greater attention. This growth in electoral competition has not proceeded evenly throughout the country. Whereas some states enjoy vibrant political climates, there are many others where authoritarian enclaves still thrive. This situation provides an excellent opportunity to learn more about partisan agenda control, particularly about the extent to which it varies with economic and electoral competition by holding a variety of factors relatively constant. This research project employs four main data sources to evaluate the variation in partisan agenda control across 30 of the 31 state legislatures. The first are elite interviews, in which former and current legislators discuss the relationship between legislator and party. The second are the agenda-setting rules governing each state legislature. The third are roll call voting records, the analysis of which can identify partisan affects on agenda control. The fourth is an in-depth case study of the agenda setting process in the state legislature of Nuevo Leon. This research project contributes to our understanding of the effect electoral incentives have on partisan agenda control by addressing the primary limitation of the Mexican state politics literature: its reliance on single state case studies. By integrating the four data sources, this research project can systematically compare agenda control in the Mexican state legislatures across two legislative terms rather than simply limit itself to a few cases at particular points in time. In short, the project will yield results that not only enjoy a high level of internal validity but can also inform us of contexts elsewhere in the world.