Sufficient Evidence: Building Certifiably Dependable Systems--A Workshop

National Academy Of Sciences, Washington DC

Investigators

Abstract

This award supports a workshop to enable public presentation and discussion of the final report of the study on "Sufficient Evidence? Building Certifiably Dependable Systems," conducted under the auspices of the National Academies. Critical systems are often subject to certification: a formal assurance that the system has met relevant technical standards designed to assure it will not unduly endanger the public, and can be depended upon to deliver its intended service safely and securely. Today, certification of the dependability of a software-based system usually relies more on assessments of the process used to develop the system than on the properties of the system itself. Although these assessments can be useful, few would dispute that direct observation of the artifact ought to provide a stronger kind of assurance than the credentials of its production method. Yet the complexity of software systems, as well as the discontinuous way that they behave, renders them extremely difficult to analyze unless great care has been taken with their structure and maintenance. This workshop provides a forum in which the conclusions from the study report will be presented and invited panels of discussants will be asked to react to the report and consider implications and next steps for relevant R&D and user communities in government, the private sector, and universities.