Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation

Duke University, Durham NC

Investigators

Abstract

Dissertation Research in Political Science: Political Parties, Economic Policy, and Democratic Consolidation Principal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University Co-Investigator: Daniel Kselman, Duke University The last 15 years have witnessed a flood of research on the political and economic consequences of formal democratic institutions. One of the most prominent research programs within this broad field examines the effect of electoral institutions on a variety of economic policies and outcomes. Though a large and heterogeneous body of work, it has nearly unanimously invoked the following logic: electoral institutions structure the domain of competition between opposing political parties, providing incumbent legislators and electoral candidates varying policy incentives depending on a countrys particular institutional configuration. Despite the importance of this research, its theoretical and empirical findings have been plagued by a series of internal contradictions. The proposed dissertation argues that such contradictions arise from a narrow focus on competition between political parties (inter-party), at the expense of an institutional analysis of competition within political parties (intra-party). Preliminary investigation in this vein (Kselman 2005, 2006) suggests that a simultaneous analysis of inter and intra-party competition permits a more general understanding of electoral institutions consequences for political corruption, economic redistribution, and the size of the public budget. Furthermore, the incorporation of intra-party competition into both formal and empirical models exposes the affect electoral institutions may have on democratic consolidation. Again, preliminary theoretical investigation specifies particular institutional combinations which may be detrimental to democratic stability. The proposed research develops a game theoretic model which generates hypotheses concerning the mutual and interactive affect of electoral institutions on economic policy and democratic stability. To assess the general applicability of the theory in as broad a manner as possible, these hypotheses are tested with cross-national data covering 70-80 democratic countries; with pooled time series data from 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2000; and with qualitative case research complemented by 6 months of intensive fieldwork in Turkey. My time in Turkey will be spent gathering locally available data on the internal organization of political parties and the nature of economic policy from 1950 to the present. As well, I will secure and conduct in depth interviews with leaders of the presently ruling Justice and Development Party, a party of Islamic heritage which has recently moved to centralize its internal power structures. Together the theoretical and empirical results help shed light on the institutional foundations of economic prosperity and democratic stability. Furthermore, the fieldwork in Turkey will provide hands on information regarding the sustainability of one of the few successes in the world in integrating political Islam and democratic competition. As such, the proposed research aims to produce results which are both scientifically rigorous and relevant in the promotion of individual and social well-being.