CSR/PDOS: Security and Incentives for Overlay Network Infrastructure

William Marsh Rice University, Houston TX

Investigators

Abstract

CNS-0509297 CSR/PDOS: Security and Incentives for Overlay Network Infrastructure Abstract: Proposed Research Overlay network systems have largely been engineered to operate in a world where every node cooperatively executes the protocol as specified. Nodes either operate correctly, or cease to work altogether (i.e., fail-stop). This model is quite successful when nodes can trust one another, but this limits overlay systems from operating in the more general case when they might be operating on untrusted, end-user computers. Such users will be economically rational, meaning they will seek to get as much benefit from the network as possible while contributing as little of their own resources. Our research will examine extensions to these systems where nodes perform accounting, allowing them to track which nodes are and are not performing correctly, making it possible to offer preferential service to nodes that offer preferential service in return. These and other related techniques will ultimately result in incentives-compatible designs that enable a new generation of peer-to-peer applications, including distributed backup systems, distributed file systems, and distributed email systems. Our work will be disseminated as part of the FreePastry project, which provides a high-quality and scalable implementation of a variety of overlay network services and is available under a BSD-style license. Likewise, our work will become part of the next-generation Tor anonymous communication system.