EPNES: High Confidence Control of Electric Power Networks using Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms

California Institute Of Technology, Pasadena CA

Investigators

Abstract

We propose to develop a framework for designing incentives for electric power networks and their associated markets that provides robust power generation while rewarding efficiency and environmental friendliness. The key technical thrusts are: 1. Development of prototype economic mechanisms for buying and selling power addressing non-steady state performance and incorporating engineering considerations such as production efficiency and environmental emissions. 2. Analysis and synthesis of information fusion and feedback control mechanisms at the component, network, and market levels providing high performance and robust operation in the presence of uncertainty and faults. 3. Implementation of economics experiments to test engineering performance and market volatility of representative power networks, using 20-30 human subjects and software agents interacting with a distributed simulation of a large scale power system. We will combine methods from control, computation and economics in a unified framework for market-based systems that is expected to be applicable to other critical infrastructure problems involving interconnected economic, information, and engineering systems. We will also develop elements of a curriculum that will provide training to students in economics, computer science, and engineering. These curriculum activities will be integrated into a novel set of interdisciplinary courses that are being developed for the newly formed Social and Information Systems Laboratory at Caltech. These courses will provide necessary training for economic and information scientists who are needed to analyze, design, implement and operate large scale social and information systems. Participation of women and underrepresented minorities will be specifically targeted and pursued through the summer undergraduate research programs.