Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: Protecting the Nation's Critical Infrastructure from Natural, Technological, and Deliberate Disasters

Yale University, New Haven CT

Investigators

Abstract

In the U.S. the concentration of urban areas, of populations in areas vulnerable to hurricanes and floods, of production and storage sites of toxic and explosive substances, all make us vulnerable to natural, industrial, and deliberate disasters. In addition, our response and recovery systems are unnecessarily inflexible and poorly funded at the local, first responder, level. Natural, industrial, and deliberate disasters have increased in the last 2 decades. This research explores the possibilities of deconcentrating targets and decentralizing response efforts. Current theory argues that deconcentration and decentralization of areas, organizations, and facilities is likely to be inefficient and expensive. However, I will examine four examples of highly decentralized systems that are very efficient, flexible, adaptive, and reliable. They provide guidance for the redesign of vulnerable areas and organizations. They are the national power grids, the Internet, networks of small firms in several nations, and (alas), terrorist networks. These systems manage to reduce two types of interdependencies that have negative system effects - physical interdependency (e.g. a railroad engine needs coal) and spatial interdependency (bundling unrelated systems together, so that if a highway bridge collapses it also brings down the power lines that it carries). These interdependencies are low because the four systems have multiple inputs (suppliers), and outputs (products) available, reducing physical interdependencies, and extensive redundancies that make spatial interdependency less problematical. The four systems maximize, however, the two forms of interdependency that facilitate safety: logical interdependency (compatible infrastructures, dependable reputations, stable governance regimes), and cyber (or communication) interdependency, where information rather than material is the commodity that is transmitted. Both of these promote resiliency and safety, and are inexpensive for the four systems. Based on these cases, recommendations will be made for reducing the vulnerability of systems with catastrophic potential, and for improving homeland security and disaster response agencies.