Collaborative Research on the Political Control of Trial Court Judges

New York University, New York NY

Investigators

Abstract

This proposal undertakes research on the origins and implications of different methods for the selection, retention, and direct control of trial court judges in the American states. The research project addresses two interrelated questions: (1) How are trial judges' decisions in office influenced by a) the method of choosing them and b) formal constraints on their discretion? (2) What explains variation in formal constraints on trial judge discretion in the American states? Trial judges are powerful actors in the American political system and the method of choosing and otherwise constraining them have been debated since the American founding. Concerns with judicial power have not, however, generated commensurate comparative empirical research on the consequences for trial judge behavior of different selection systems or ex ante constraints on judicial discretion. Moreover, political scientists have not undertaken much comparative work to explain variation in the adoption of restrictions on trial judge discretion. We seek to remedy this weakness by constructing and testing an agency-theoretic model of the selection, retention, and direct control of trial judges. This research will assist in providing empirical evidence for, and will contribute to, ongoing public policy debates about the consequences of different rules for selecting and retaining trial court judges. Unlike existing research on selection systems that focuses on voter behavior, electoral outcomes, or descriptive characteristics of judges, the researchers undertake a direct comparative examination of trial judge behavior. Further, they seek to understand how ex ante constraints on discretion like sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences interact with selection systems to influence trial judges' behavior. While political scientists have examined the behavior of appellate court judges in different electoral systems, these findings may not extend to the actions of the more numerous and less publicly visible trial judges whose actions in large part govern the case-by-case application of the state's coercive authority. The researchers will continue research currently underway, to compile three datasets for quantitative analysis and to conduct unstructured qualitative interviews with sitting trial judges in a variety of institutional contexts. The project offers two significant downstream benefits. First, the investigators construct and document three datasets detailing judicial sentencing behavior, the selection experience and biographical characteristics of trial judges, and the nature of direct constraints on judicial discretion. These datasets and accompanying documentation will be placed in the public domain. These datasets will complement research on state appellate courts and allow other researchers to conduct comparative research on judicial selection, trial judge behavior, and state criminal justice policymaking. Second, undertaking this research will provide opportunities to enhance the training of graduate students by involving them in the construction, documentation, and analysis of the datasets used in this project.