Empirical Testing of Crisis Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information

University Of California-Los Angeles, Los Angeles CA

Investigators

Abstract

A central problem in the study of international conflict is to understand the factors that influence states' incentives and behavior in crisis situations involving the threat or use of force. What variables influence how states assess the attractiveness of waging war? When will the targets of threats choose to yield or resist? When will leaders implement the threats they make? This project advances a method for addressing such questions in a manner that is faithful to the nature of strategic interaction in international crises. Inferences from observational data can only be made with confidence when the uncertainty and potential for signaling that are inherent in such situations are accounted for. The project has three components. First, the project develops an empirical estimator (and computer software to implement it) that is derived directly from a game-theoretic model that incorporates incomplete information. Second, leveraging existing international data sets, data are collected that codes conflict outcomes in a way that is consistent with current theoretical treatments of interstate crisis bargaining. Third, the data and method are be used to test prominent theories of international conflict. This project is part of the Empirical Implications of Theoretic Models priority area in the Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Directorate.