Incentive-Compatible Designs for Distributed Systems

Yale University, New Haven CT

Investigators

Abstract

This project includes the research activities to obtain theoretical and practical results on mechanisms that are incentive-compatible, scalable and distributed. Specifically, distributed algorithmic mechanism design with insights from game theory is proposed for three related problems in networking: interdomain routing, web caching and peer-to-peer file sharing. The research program on interdomain routing will develop a fundamentally new approach in which many of the routing-related incentive issues are handled by incentive-compatible protocols rather than bilateral contracts; such protocols can more effectively address the system-wide issues of efficient routing and conflicting policy requirements. Within this project also the recently developed techniques for digital-goods auctions will be applied to the peer-to-peer file sharing problem and to the design of incentive-compatible caching mechanisms. This project will help to understand better the behaviors of large-scale, distributed information systems formed by autonomous components such as Internet, and develop incentive-compatible algorithms for these systems accordingly.