Economic and Political Implications of Different Electoral Rules

Ohio State University Research Foundation -Do Not Use, Columbus OH

Investigators

Abstract

The design or reform of electoral rules has been a subject of intense debate in many countries all over the world. Moreover, the choice of an electoral system may have important economic consequences, because of the induced difference in terms of the elected policy-making body. In this project I compare proportional representation systems and majoritarian systems in terms of: (1) the number of effective parties; (2) the expected policies, policy variance and welfare; (3) corruption; (4) strategic versus sincere voting; (5) affirmative action and gender equality. These objectives are pursued theoretically as well as empirically: the representative democracy model has to allow for strategic party behavior, strategic voting, free entry of candidates and new parties, and incumbency advantages, and politicians must be allowed to have both policy preferences and private objectives. With all these ingredients the model suggests that majoritarian systems induce more policy variance, less corruption, and less gender equality: these and many other predictions will be tested on international data and on the basis of some detailed country studies. The theoretical and empirical conclusions of the project can be important for electoral design in new democracies as well as for electoral reforms in established democracies. Beside the consequences of electoral formulas, the policy relevant conclusions of the project will involve the comparison of closed versus open list systems, the effectiveness and desirability of gender quotas, the optimal legal thresholds in proportional systems, and the optimal mix of public and private campaign financing. Moreover, the theoretical framework will probably be very useful for future researchers interested in other aspects of democratic policymaking.