Religious Radicals and Fertility: An Economic Approach

National Bureau Of Economic Research Inc, Cambridge MA

Investigators

Abstract

This project studies the economics and demographics of religious radicalism, particularly in Islam. Radical Islam is an ascendant geopolitical force. Like the Christian Anabaptist sects and the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox, Radical Islam is a relatively recent religious innovation. It arose in the mid 20th century in what historians describe as a reaction to the incursion of secular, market driven, Western culture into traditional society. Like those Christian and Jewish sects its growth represents a paradox to economists. As markets increase the shadow value of time price theory predicts the evolution of time-efficient forms of religious practice. Yet a religious sect evolves which insists on an increasingly time-intensive version of practice, and paradoxically it flourishes. Like radical Christian and Jewish sects, radical Islam owes part of its remarkable growth to high fertility, especially in contrast to the fertility decline of the mainstream Muslim majority. This research makes and explores the consequences of four arguments: First, the formation of radical religious groups has an economic explanation derived from the theory of clubs, which rationalizse both the increased stringency of practice and high (or even rising) fertility. Second, there is strong evidence that radical religious groups can raise fertility rates. At least three groups have experienced protracted episodes of fertility increases over the past 20 years: Iranians, Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. High fertility among the radical religious, against a background of fertility transition among traditional and secularizing groups could undermine political stability and economic development in the Muslim world. Third, I propose estimating the size of differential fertility rates of radical religious groups by linking indicators of religious affiliation to micro data from household surveys which report on economic variables and fertility. This allows a test of the hypothesis that subsidies to radical religious groups are strongly pronatalist. The feasibility of these procedures is illustrated in four cases, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, the Muslim Brothers in Israel, Muslim religious community schools in Indonesia and the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. In the first case results from completed work are reported and in the next two preliminary results are given. Finally, fertility is an easily quantified way that radical religious groups affect behavior, but not the only way. I also examine the advantage of religious sects such as the Taliban and Hamas in operating militias and in dispatching suicide bombers. This advantage can explain why radical religious sects so often turn to violent action.