SGER: Political Economy of Financial Markets

Princeton University, Princeton NJ

Investigators

Abstract

Politics structures the regulatory and legal institutions that delimit the operation of financial markets. The political outcomes have major impacts on such important matters as the openness of financial markets, the balance between investor protection and managerial prerogatives, and the tradeoff between creditor and debtor rights. The need for a research agenda in this area led to the organization of a research network in Europe "Understanding Financial Architecture: Legal and Political Frameworks and Economic Efficiency." The network was funded by the European Union. This grant supports a small conference on the Political Economy of Financial Markets at Princeton University. The purpose of the conference is to explore the development of an international and interdisciplinary community in this area. The potential topics include financial development, corporate governance, bankruptcy, debt forgiveness, and credit markets for the poor. Invitations to participate in the conference are extended to scholars, particularly junior scholars, from a broad cross-section of Universities in the United States. The conference brings together potential American partners to the European network on the political economy of financial institutions.