Dissertation Research: Economic Liberalization and the Expansion of Judicial Power in Contemporary Egypt

University Of Washington, Seattle WA

Investigators

Abstract

This proposal seeks to explain why the Egyptian government established an independent constitutional court that has increasingly constrained its ability to control opponents of the regime. The PI hypothesizes that the constitutional court was established by the regime in order to encourage private investment in Egypt's newly liberalized economy and that the court has been able to withstand increasing pressure from the executive branch by supporting the regime's economic liberalization program and by cultivating important networks of support with opposition parties, legal associations, and business groups. This study is designed with several theory-development goals in mind: to assess the impact of economic liberalization upon national judicial institutions in the developing world; to better understand the role of legal institutions in economic development; and to increase understanding of the conditions under which independent judicial institutions emerge from within non-liberal polities. To test these hypotheses, the PI will conduct 12 months of research in Cairo, Egypt and will analyze constitutional court cases for evidence of court activism over time and across economic and political issue areas. Cases will be coded according to their impact on the regime and on other dimensions relevant to strategic behavior by the judges. The PI will also trace a sample of rulings to ascertain impediments to the implementation of court rulings.