The Generation of Cooperation Through First Decisions

Texas A&M Research Foundation, College Station TX

Investigators

Abstract

This award supports a two-year program of experimental studies comparing several theoretical perspectives on the choice to cooperate or to behave selfishly in a social dilemma situation. (Social dilemmas occur in cases such as public goods, subject to "free riding," or taking advantage of payments by others without contributing to the common good.) Previous research has shown that the first decision to cooperate or to defect is very important, usually setting a precedent for subsequent behavior in the situation. Drawing on social psychological theories of context and framing, expected utility theories or rewards, and prospect theories of anticipated benefit, the PI has formulated a set of contrasting hypotheses of principles governing first decisions. The hypotheses will be assessed in laboratory experiments allowing choices between contributing to a public good, withholding contribution, or taking from the public good without contributing. Results will be used to develop a theoretical understanding of factors influencing first choices. The theories should also have practical implications for many public good situations.