Experimental Testing of a Theory of Group Solidarity

Indiana University Of Pennsylvania, Indiana PA

Investigators

Abstract

This project has two elements. First, it proposes to test propositions derived from a recognized rational choice theory of group cooperation. Second, as a side benefit, it will help establish a small, computer-controlled experimental laboratory usable for future rational choice experiments. Rational choice theories explain behavior as a consequence of individuals' attempts to maximize rewards and minimize costs. Thus "free riding" on public goods-in which individuals can benefit even if they do not contribute-is an important theoretical (and practical) problem. Michael Hechter has proposed a theory in which social control to prevent free riding is a function of visibility and extensiveness of norms governing cooperation. The theoretical contribution of this project states Hechter's theory formally, permitting deriving testable propositions on control. Kanazawa's theory treats visibility as the cost to gain information on cooperation or selfish behavior. Normative extensiveness is inversely related to an individual's dependence on the group. One theorem from the explicit theory is that group solidarity, which is produced by high levels of cooperation among members, is high when visibility and dependence on the group both are high. Experimental theory tests will be conducted with volunteer subjects playing a game in which they decide how to allocate points between themselves and the group. A mixed-motive game structure developed by other investigators will be adapted for the theory tests here. The game and point allocations will be controlled and recorded by a local network of computers purchased with funds from this project. Because the game structure in which points are given and taken is quite general, that network will be usable for additional experiments testing rational choice theories having different payoffs, amounts of information, and communication structures.