How does a Norm Break down? Explaining the Collapse of the Norm of Premarital Abstinence and the Emergence of Cohabitation

Wagner College, Staten Island NY

Investigators

Abstract

Abstract SES 9911382 Chien Liu This research develops and tests through simulations a model of formation and decay of social norms. Building on ideas in rational choice and economic behavior, the model explicates an idea that negative externalities-costs borne by a group-tend to create proscriptive norms against behavior causing the externalities. When externalities decrease or disappear, a proscriptive norm tends to disappear. Essentially, the model will specify precisely a mechanism often suggested in sociological and economic literature. The model will include multiple iteration with feedback. While certain features of the model's overall structure may be evaluated logically, the iterative aspects would be cumbersome or impossible to assess except by computer simulation. Much of the cost of this project is to develop computer programs for simulating the model's processes. While this project is purely theoretical, it is possible to think of natural analogues of the process described. For instance, norms against many sorts of white-collar crimes, from bribery to embezzlement, can be construed as attempts to reduce group costs. On the other hand, positive norms such as patriotism and self-sacrifice in war may be seen as resulting from a need to avoid potential group externalities. The general topic of how norms arise, are maintained, and sometimes decay has recently attracted considerable attention of sociologists, working from several theoretical perspectives. This work adds to those views. The model in this research uses well-accepted ideas of reward and cost to explain norm formation, a promising approach. To the extent it is successful, this work will expand understanding of how culture gets built up and sometimes disintegrates.